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In the early twentieth century, Rand McNally held a large share of the 
commercial market for maps and atlases in the United States. How the 
company built its reputation as an American cartographic authority—by 
both accepting and resisting change—is the subject of this essay. Critical 
to the company’s success was its ability to design materials that rein-
forced American notions of how the world ought to appear, an indica-
tion that the history of cartography is governed not just by technological 
and scientific advances, but also by a complex interplay between map-
makers and consumers.
or millions of Americans, the name Rand McNally is synonymous 
with maps. For over a century the company has held a disproportion-
ate share of the educational and general market for atlases and maps, and 
has enjoyed a reputation of cartographic authority in America rivaled 
only by the National Geographic Society. In the wake of the Civil War, 
Rand McNally introduced new, less expensive techniques into the histori-
cally costly and time-consuming craft of mapmaking, and in the process 
brought maps and atlases within reach of an entirely new segment of 
the American population. By the late 1890s, the nation’s activist politics 
abroad sparked in Americans a keen interest in world geography; thus the 
Spanish American War proved a boon to Rand McNally as well as Hearst 
and Pulitzer. This widened audience—boosted by technological change, 
the nation’s expansionist posture abroad, and a growing leisure market at 
home after World War One—encouraged Rand McNally to adopt more ag-
gressive and sophisticated strategies in the hope of controlling its increas-
ingly national market. More specifically, the company strengthened its 
reputation in these years by designing maps and atlases that balanced its 
own cartographic imperatives against the public’s expectations of what a 
map and an atlas ought to be. How the company negotiated its success in 
the early twentieth century—by both accepting and resisting change—is 
the subject of this essay.
At the turn of the century, American mapmaking had only recently 
become a truly mass phenomenon. This dramatic change was largely 
attributable to the introduction of a new process known as wax engrav-
ing, exploited most successfully by Rand McNally. A small printing firm 
founded in the 1870s, Rand McNally initially produced railroad tickets 
and timetables, and soon noticed a demand for railway maps as well. The 
decision to adopt the new technique of wax engraving brought an entirely 
new style of map into circulation. Technically, the process allowed the 
inclusion of as much type as desired on a map, while earlier hand letter-
ing techniques had naturally circumscribed the amount of information 
possible. In this regard, the advent of wax engraving coincided nicely with 
the expansion of railroads, as the former could easily detail the individual 
routes of an expanding national transportation network. Soon American 
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mapmaking firms were living by the credo that “more is better,” loading 
the maps with as much information as possible rather than limiting the 
number of place names to emphasize the largest or most important (Fig-
ure 1). Ironically, it was the apparently democratic practice of including as 
many towns as possible on the map—facilitated by wax engraving—that 
transformed the nature and character of American mapping. By identify-
ing as many locations as possible, regardless of size, the maps offered little 
indication of relative population density. In addition to suggesting that 
all areas were equally settled, these maps encouraged readers to identify 
discrete locations rather than to explore relationships, a fact confirmed 
by the ever more comprehensive indexes at the end of the atlas that listed 
virtually every town or village. This reference quality was perhaps the at-
lases’ strongest selling point, but in the process topographic contours and 
spot elevations were sacrificed. For this and other reasons contemporary 
cartographers and geographers often judged wax engraving an aestheti-
cally inferior process that diminished the need and opportunity to learn 
map-making skills such as feature selection. Over time, this prevailing 
style began to entrench itself, transforming a historical practice into a car-
tographic ideal, an accidental aesthetic that transcended the circumstances 
of time and technology.1
Figure 1. Detail of a wax engraved map from Rand McNally’s Premier Atlas of the World (1924). Notice the emphasis on place names at the expense of 
the terrain itself, particularly suitable for an age of rail travel and national expansion westward.
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Despite the stylistic inflexibility of the wax-engraved maps, the early twen-
tieth century represents a turning point for the world atlases that contained 
them. In the 1880s and early 1890s, from 75 to 80 percent of atlas maps were 
devoted to the United States. The New Household Atlas of the World (1885) 
gave two pages to a map of Alabama but covered the African continent in 
a single page. Though designated as “world” atlases, the vast majority of 
the atlas maps were dedicated to the United States, which the format of the 
atlas separated from the rest of the world. The atlases organized the world 
according to levels of progress—savage, enlightened, civilized—achieved 
by the different races, nations, and continents, categories that were them-
selves conflated through prominent illustrations of the “four quarters of the 
globe.” Generally, the atlases brought the world home to Americans largely 
as a spectacle, a distant reality that conformed to existing notions of racial 
and cultural hierarchy.
The flurry of American activity abroad in the 1890s, however, recast 
many of the conventions in the world atlas. Territorial acquisitions as well 
as the “rediscovery” of Alaska after the Yukon gold strike encouraged Rand 
McNally to design cheap, mass-produced “war atlases” for the public in 
1898 and 1899. These brief atlases—the first of their kind in America—as 
well as the peacetime world atlases that followed began to narrate their 
geographical subjects in terms of resources and commerce rather than race. 
This reconceptualization of the world around resources and commerce 
dominated the atlases both as a motive for acquiring territory and as an 
evaluative framework. The reorientation of foreign policy at the turn of the 
century accelerated this shift from a world of racial hierarchy in which the 
United States stood apart to an economic world in which the nation was 
actively involved. This unconditional support for American economic and 
territorial expansionism is reflected in new maps and descriptions of Cuba, 
the Philippines, and other areas under American jurisdiction. Maps of these 
acquisitions were prominently and proudly featured in war atlases, indi-
cating that the goal was not just to chronicle the conflict but also to defend 
the territorial spoils of war. In Rand McNally’s 1898 War Atlas, for instance, 
“vital information” printed about the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico fo-
cused on exports and resources rather than culture or race. In the same year 
Rand McNally introduced and evaluated the new territories according to 
their actual and potential commercial value. These profiles were typified by 
frequent histories of the Philippines that emphasized the islands’ economic 
wealth but made only cursory mention of social or political life. Commer-
cial profiles were also used to introduce America’s emerging relationship 
to Hawaii, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, as well as the newly discovered riches 
of Alaska (Rand McNally 1898a, 8-9, 12-13). War atlases, like the wartime 
issues of the National Geographic, were graphic arguments for the American 
mission abroad. Both media visually introduced the public to the new pos-
sessions and celebrated their potential contribution to American wealth. In 
both cases, the “science” of geography had translated controversial events 
and policies into matters of fact for middlebrow consumption. 
After the turn of the century the number of United States maps de-
clined to about 50 percent, making twentieth-century atlases significantly 
more cosmopolitan than their predecessors.2 And while late-century at-
lases began with maps of the world and the hemispheres, those designed 
in the wake of the Spanish American War rushed to narrate the nation’s 
past and future gain by first featuring the new territories of the Pacific and 
the Caribbean. As late as World War I, Rand McNally’s Imperial Atlas—the 
name itself significant—opened with a map of America’s epic growth 
across the west and around the world (Figure 2). The Imperial Atlas had re-
invented the United States by extending its borders beyond the continent. 
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As one reviewer commented,
It does look a little bit odd to see Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the distant 
Philippine islands on the United States map. But they are there and 
printed as carefully and described as carefully as if they had been for a 
whole generation in their present honored company.3
The nation had arrived on the world stage, a claim conveyed by Rand 
McNally’s decision to separate maps of the European powers from those 
of their colonies rather than to group them according to the principle of 
imperial unity applied to the United States.4
These atlases disproportionately covered the nation’s new territories, 
a trend mirrored in the contemporary issues of the National Geographic. 
Rand McNally’s Imperial Atlas of 1904 boasted four maps of Manila Bay 
but only three for all of Africa. A 1912 atlas introduced an elaborate map 
of the Philippines, and one marketed in 1915 devoted two full pages to 
the West Indies. The detail of these maps, like American interest, peaked 
Figure 2. Rand McNally’s map of expansion, 1900. Rather than convincing readers to support the Spanish-American War, the map simply framed the 
territories as the latest installments in a progressive, unfolding national history. Through cartography—which gave these changes a kind of authority and 
permanence—the divisive war had been transformed from controversial politics into immutable history.
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prior to World War One.5 As one company employee candidly remarked, 
the degree of attention given to any region was a function of, among other 
things, its “relative commercial or industrial importance.” 6 Hammond’s 
Pictorial Atlas of 1912 used a thematic map to organize the world not ac-
cording to language spoken—a common practice in the nineteenth cen-
tury—but according to language used to conduct commerce.
The changing narrative text of the atlas over time also indicates the 
fluid nature of the atlas. The 1887 edition of the Pocket Atlas, Rand Mc-
Nally’s most popular series, described Japan as a social hierarchy with an 
absolute monarchy and compulsory school attendance, and then briefly 
enumerated its chief agricultural products (Rand McNally 1887, 38). Yet 
by 1900 the atlas focused on Japan’s rising manufacturing, trade, and 
mineral wealth, and described its principal cities in terms of the com-
mercial infrastructures such as the extent of rail connections, ports, and 
industry. The Philippines, briefly passed over in the 1887 edition, were 
lovingly described by 1900 as having both “undeveloped” and “unsur-
passed” resources (Rand McNally 1900, 331, 334, 339). In a similar vein, 
the profiles of Cuba changed radically between 1887 and 1900. In 1887 the 
colony was profiled briefly in a larger section on the West Indies through 
statistics on population, ethnic breakdown, geographical features, mineral 
wealth, and education (Rand McNally 1887, 179). Not surprisingly, in 1900 
the American protectorate was given its own section apart from the West 
Indies, with a more comprehensive history of the island, including dates 
of discovery and exploration, wars, emancipation, and the details of the 
American occupation after the war with Spain. Following the island’s his-
tory, extensive descriptions of Cuba’s climate, forests, and mineral wealth 
accompanied a substantially more hopeful profile of its resources.
Forests [are] among [the] most valuable resources of the island. . . . Soil 
of almost inexhaustible fertility and highly favorable climatic condi-
tions entitle Cuba to rank among the foremost agricultural countries of 
the world. Resources, however, are largely undeveloped, but possibili-
ties of the island are almost incalculable. . . . Minerals abundant and 
valuable. (Rand McNally 1900, 219, 222-223)
With “innumerable varieties” of fruit trees that grew “luxuriantly,” the 
atlas enthusiastically advertised the island’s potential for trade. All these 
qualities gave Cuba tremendous commercial promise, a far cry from the 
description of 1887. Yet while the 1900 edition of the atlas pronounced 
Cuba’s mineral wealth “abundant and valuable . . . in some, deposits are 
inexhaustible” (Rand McNally 1900, 222, 228), by 1936 enthusiasm had 
died and the minerals were simply noted as “not of great commercial 
importance” (Rand McNally 1936, 246).7 In these and other instances, char-
acterizations of the natural world were themselves negotiable, as subject 
to change as political boundaries or foreign policy.
In the wake of the Spanish American War, newspapers and mass-cir-
culation monthlies were full of cartoons using cartographic imagery to 
persuade readers of the nation’s urgent mission abroad. Illustrations of 
Uncle Sam extending his reach around the globe or of Spain’s pathetic 
retreat across the Atlantic translated the distant geography of the war into 
a comprehensible spatial narrative that implicitly endorsed American ex-
pansion. Similarly, while nineteenth-century atlases had underscored the 
gulf that lay between the United States and the rest of the world, those of 
the early twentieth century began to imagine an international community 
centered on a more activist, interventionist home country.
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Europe’s descent into war generated a slew of popular war atlases in Ameri-
ca, almost all of which were produced by private map companies. In many 
cases, though, the firms had little incentive to design maps specifically for 
the conflict, and simply repackaged existing maps of Europe. Symbolic was 
Rand McNally’s Atlas of the European Conflict (1914a), which opened with 
a map of the world centered on the United States, one that necessarily di-
vided Europe itself.8 In the Graphic Representation of the Battle Fields of Today, 
Rand McNally used an existing commercial map of Germany that featured 
towns, sea routes, and shipping schedules. The map was difficult to read, 
overlettered, and strewn with details appropriate to an interest in peacetime 
commerce rather than wartime strategy.9 Much of the difference between 
the European and American war maps was one of scale: generally the maps 
made in Europe depicted areas on a larger scale, which allowed for clearer 
relational descriptions. But because the American maps were taken from 
existing collections, their scales were qualitatively smaller and unsuitable 
for more than a cursory overview of the battlefields.10
Even the National Geographic Society, highly sensitive to public taste, 
replicated existing cartographic styles. The Society had long issued maps 
with its magazines, the earliest of which were designed to chronicle politi-
cal conflicts such as the Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish-American War, 
the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War. But it was not until World War 
One that any of these maps were drawn by the Society itself. The 1918 
map of the western front—the first to be created by the Society’s new 
Cartographic Division—looked much like those made by Rand McNally, 
dull in appearance and with the overall contours of battle lost in an infi-
nite jumble of place names. Yet it was this apparent “flaw”—the inclusion 
of every conceivable place name regardless of its significance—that was 
eagerly welcomed by the Society’s own members. One member, who kept 
the map on his office wall, was thrilled with its inclusion of “more towns 
and villages than any other”; it was this quality that allowed him to follow 
the battles with precision.11 Albert Holt Bumstead, the Society’s head car-
tographer from the 1910s until his death in 1940, confirmed this sentiment 
in a letter to the Geographic’s editor Gilbert Grosvenor in 1915. Discussing 
possible improvements for the look of the Society’s maps, Bumstead de-
cided to erase the contour lines that marked elevation, explaining that
Contours mean much to me, but I must admit with disappointment 
that to most map users they are nothing but a confusion. Elevation is 
probably the least important of the information given on the map, so 
lets [sic] not sacrifice the clearness of anything else for its emphasis.12
Caleb Hammond, head of the Hammond map company from 1948 to 
1968, concurred: Americans made sense of maps through towns that were 
relevant to them, and relief markings simply competed with and detracted 
from that goal. Though surely a generalization, occasionally the public 
confirmed Hammond’s assumption, such as this suggestion sent to the 
National Geographic Society during the war:
I would like to have an atlas showing every TOWN in EUROPE and 
ASIA big enough to have a POST OFFICE and every STREAM long 
enough to have a NAME.13
To this reader, maps were useful and valuable to the extent that they 
allowed one to identify multiple, discrete locations, even though it was 
precisely this feature that many European and American cartographers 
found so maddening. 
WORLD  WAR  ONE
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Though the maps were slow to reflect change, the text of the war atlases 
quickly responded to changes in American foreign policy. From Archduke 
Ferdinand’s assassination in 1914 to Woodrow Wilson’s declaration of war 
three years later, the United States maintained formal, if not actual, neu-
trality in Europe. Ethnic divisions and the desire to continue trading with 
members of both the entente and the alliance delayed what might have 
been an earlier commitment to defend Britain, and these atlases—as per-
fectly aligned with the state as they had been in 1898—reflected the same. 
Rand McNally’s 1914 Atlas of the European Conflict characterized the war 
as a result of “the thirst for aggrandizement of empire, political, military, 
and commercial, and the mutual fear and jealousy of kings.” For years, the 
atlas claimed, the world lived in fear of the inevitable clash between the 
nations of Europe, 
each shouldering immense burdens of armament, each straining to sur-
pass the other in strength, and power to destroy. Engines of war have 
been perfected until man’s ingenuity in the preparation of catastrophic 
elements has been exhausted. (Rand McNally 1914a, n.p.)
But after the nation’s entrance into war in April 1917, the company 
placed blame squarely on America’s new enemies. Prussia had “foisted 
itself upon the confederacy of German states as the dominant power, the 
seat of an hereditary autocracy, and the controller of the constitution and 
the armed forces of the newly created empire” (Rand McNally 1917, 6). 
The war could now be understood as a result of Prussia’s expansionist 
drive, yet this by no means translated into a denunciation of imperialism. 
As the atlas explained, 
The power and wealth of a nation may be measured to a certain extent 
by the amount of territory she controls at home and abroad. Every 
square mile of territory is a source of revenue and mineral, agricultural, 
or manufactured products, offers a field for export and commercial 
exploitation, and yields land and customs revenue for the state. (Rand 
McNally 1917, 10)
These atlases immediately integrated Wilson’s decision to enter the war 
by vilifying the ideology of America’s new enemies: it was world domina-
tion, not economic expansion, that the atlases judged unacceptable. 14
World War I brought dramatic upheaval to the boundaries of Europe. As 
a result of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires were dismantled to make way for Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
and a newly independent Poland. States in the Middle East also gained 
independence from the breakup of empire, leaving Turkey a small state, 
while Palestine, Jordan, and what is today Iraq were taken by the British, 
and Lebanon and Syria by the French. Africa was similarly redistributed 
among the victors. In Europe and the Middle East the war had drama-
tized the flexible nature of geography and left many Americans confused. 
Cartographic companies were quick to capitalize on this sense of epic 
geographic change. The romantic adventures of Lindbergh’s flight across 
the Atlantic and Byrd’s explorations of the South Pole also contributed to 
this swell of interest in geography. International radio news broadcasts 
of the 1920s encouraged listeners to follow events with an atlas, and the 
immensely popular American School of the Air became required listening 
in 200,000 classrooms over the course of its eighteen-year life from 1930 to 
1948. Educational and popular radio programs exposed young listeners 
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to world events, exotic locales, and the feats of American explorers in the 
interwar era. The American public also became increasingly accustomed 
to reading maps after the automobile revolution of the 1920s. Oil com-
panies began to give away road atlases at service stations, a practice that 
brought countless Americans into contact with maps on a daily basis and 
prompted one comment that “Map reading is no longer the trying, dif-
ficult schoolroom task it used to be.” Within this responsive set of circum-
stances after World War One, Rand McNally embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to protect and enlarge its sales through advertising, public 
relations, and even tariffs. In the process, the company secured not just its 
dominance of the atlas market but also its reputation among Americans as 
a cartographic authority.15
Despite the upheavals in Europe and the expanding consumer market 
at home, the world atlas emerged from the war with much of its prewar 
form and content intact. Rand McNally’s revised Ideal Atlas of the World 
introduced even more focused information about the natural resources of 
the world presented through a candid discussion of America’s need for 
markets and the commercial gains it had made in the war. The continu-
ing commercial focus of the postwar atlases accompanied an increasing 
interest in the world as a physical manifestation, which reflected a grow-
ing interest in the physical world brought by professional geographers 
under the leadership of William Morris Davis and the physical surveys of 
North America carried out by the United States Geological Survey and the 
Army Corps of Engineers. The same agencies had surveyed the American 
territories in the early twentieth century; in the 1920s and 1930s, private 
cartographers conducted surveys of the United States, Europe, Japan, and 
South America. 
These new surveys of the non-American world brought attention to the 
physical world, and new maps began to emphasize the physical layout 
of the land by charting climatic patterns, elevation, and sea currents. Yet 
the major American map companies generally excluded this information 
from their popular atlases after judging it appropriate for school students 
but not for the general population. This is nicely illustrated by the arrival 
of Rand McNally’s Goode’s School Atlas in 1923, introduced to fill the ris-
ing demand for physical atlases in the secondary schools. The atlas was 
conceived and executed by John Paul Goode, a professor of geography at 
the University of Chicago and since 1900 the chief cartographic advisor 
to Rand McNally. Overall, Goode’s atlas, like most others in the interwar 
years, continued to be dominated by economic and commercial maps and 
information. Even so, the atlas was innovative in its rejection of the Merca-
tor projection and its focus on the physical nature of the earth.
Until this point, the world had consistently been depicted on the six-
teenth-century Mercator projection. Widespread recognition of the limits 
of this projection did not develop until the 1930s and 1940s. (Woodrow 
Wilson was far ahead of his time when in 1913 he asked Americans to turn 
toward the globe in order to realize that nearly all of South America lay 
east of North America [Paterson 1989, 505].) The concept of projection was 
simply not yet part of American culture, and would not be until well after 
the First World War. By comparison, the 1882 edition of Stieler’s Hand Atlas, 
one of the most widely printed German atlases, displayed no less than nine 
different projections on its title page, implicitly suggesting the malleability 
of cartography (Scharfe 1997). Such a display would not have been cultur-
ally meaningful—and therefore possible—for the American public until the 
mid-twentieth century. This made the publication of Goode’s School Atlas in 
1923 even more provocative, as it argued the irrelevance of the Mercator 
projection and emphasized the limits of any attempt to map the earth ac-
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curately. Suddenly students were confronted with multiple “truths”—pro-
jections of all kinds that reconfigured the earth in startling ways—and then 
learned the distortions of each, the Mercator projection being only the most 
egregious case. As students turned the pages of the new atlas they found 
a strange new alternative based on Goode’s own homolosine projection 
(Figure 3), an attempt to correct for Mercator’s long-accepted flaws (Figure 
4). With interruptions at the northern and southern latitudes, the new map 
challenged the cartographic sensibilities of both the general public and 
professional mapmakers. Andrew McNally recalled that although Goode’s 
School Atlas sold well in schools, the unfamiliar homolosine world map 
made it insufficiently “unified” to pass muster with the general public. One 
employee called it “a very confusing book” for its depiction of the world 
as “four irregular ovals connected at the North Pole, one a bit longer than 
the others and with a jagged tooth on its eastern side.” National Geographic 
editor Gilbert Grosvenor, writing to his new chief cartographer after the 
armistice, called attention to Goode’s new homolosine projection as clearly 
Figure 3. The twentieth-century homolosine projection.
Figure 4. The sixteenth-century Mercator projection.
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superior to the “atrocious” Mercator projection, but like McNally found it 
lacking in intelligibility and visual appeal. Grosvenor offered $2,000 for a 
new projection that combined the improved accuracy of the homolosine 
projection but with the graphic appeal of Mercator’s world.16
The orientation of the map was equally jarring. American students 
surveyed the world map to find Europe, rather than their own country, at 
its center. In this respect Goode challenged a long tradition that dated back 
to 1850, the publication of the first American-made map known to place 
the western hemisphere at the middle, rather than to the left.17 With few 
exceptions later atlases continued to divide Eurasia rather than sacrifice 
the centrality of the United States, a practice encouraged by the growing 
importance of the Pacific to the nation in the twentieth century. In fact, the 
National Geographic Society mapped the world with the United States at 
the center almost without exception until 1975.18 This made the appear-
ance of Goode’s homolosine world map even more disruptive.
The content of Goode’s maps were as disorienting as their shape. The 
first edition of the atlas did not even include a political map that divided 
the world along national lines. Though the later editions introduced more 
traditional political maps, far more central were the extensive maps of 
ocean currents, climate, vegetation, and elevation (Figure 5). The physical 
maps were a clear departure for Rand McNally, rarely if ever included pre-
viously though a matter of course in European atlases. Though the com-
pany was assured a readership for the atlas within schools, many doubted 
the extent to which it would draw public interest. Andrew McNally II, 
then president of the company, was especially skeptical. Though he recog-
nized the scientific superiority of the physical maps, he was wistful for the 
more romantic political maps that had become customary representations 
of the world. As one interviewer wrote, 
a world made up of only slightly varying shades of green and brown 
hasn’t half the appeal (or the romance) of a world of pink and blue 
and yellow. And while it’s nice to know that the city of Manchester is 
situated (say) ninety feet above sea level, still it is more fun to be able 
to pick out all over the world the little pink spots of the British Empire. 
(Grant 1956, 20-21).
The political map, dividing the world into empires and nations, had itself 
become normative, a kind of metageography. Many of Goode’s revolution-
ary physical maps and projections were therefore only gradually intro-
duced into the popular atlases. Not until 1937 did Rand McNally include 
world physical relief maps, maps of temperature provinces, and annual 
rainfall maps in its mass-marketed atlases. Even though it might have 
presented a more comprehensive picture, Goode’s world was disturbing to 
many at Rand McNally.19 As one employee commented, 
The total impression, once you get over the shock of a world so
grievously sundered, is good; . . . political lines are so subordinated to 
physical features that one is brought up sharply in the realization
that . . . France actually does run over into Germany, and Germany into 
Austria; that one isn’t permanently separated from the next by a line
and a band of color. But again, the absence of all familiar color makes 
the book a purely utilitarian object, and not the glamorous gateway to 
romance that an atlas used to be.20 
One of Rand McNally’s reigning credos had been to create “a harmoni-
ous and pleasant looking world.” This translated into one divided along 
“The content of Goode’s maps 
were as disorienting as their 
shape.”
“Though Andrew McNally 
recognized the scientific
superiority of the physical 
maps, he was wistful for the 
more romantic political maps 
that had become customary
representations of the world.”
“The political map, dividing the 
world into empires and nations, 
had itself become normative, a 
kind of metageography.”
“One of Rand McNally’s
reigning credos had been to cre-
ate ‘a harmonious and
pleasant looking world.’”
cartographic perspectives    
     
                                1Number 35, Winter 2000
PROTECTING  A MASS  MARKET
Figure 5. Detail from Goode’s physical map of the American northwest.
political lines, as for many this had become the normative representation 
of the world on a map.21 The rise of physical mapping challenged the 
familiarity of the political map that had dominated for decades, and high-
lighted the degree to which the latter had come to be understood not as a 
representation of the landscape, but as the landscape itself. In this regard 
maps are strongest and most persuasive—most scientific and powerful—
when they tell consistent messages. More than a decade would pass before 
Goode’s odd looking maps, though highly successful in American schools, 
were deemed acceptable for popular consumption and incorporated into 
the company’s general atlases. In the meantime Rand McNally had made 
clear decisions about the kind of world the public would see. 
Rand McNally cultivated its authoritative reputation in the interwar 
years in part through public relations, in part by producing custom maps, 
globes, and geographic displays for corporate clients and well-known in-
dividuals. American Airways, Texaco Oil, CBS Radio, the Bureau of Recla-
mation, International Harvester, National Cash Register, and the Christian 
Science Monitor were just a few of the organizations that contracted with 
“. . . Rand McNally had made 
clear decisions about the kind of 
world the public would see.”
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Figure 6. Rand McNally ad from 1920, touting the precision of its maps and their wartime utility.
Rand McNally to build massive public maps and globes in company lob-
bies, expositions, store windows, and railway terminals. Dozens of these 
projects helped build the company’s name as a ubiquitous, reliable, and 
authoritative source of knowledge about the world between the wars.22
The company also initiated aggressive advertising campaigns to capi-
talize on the prosperity of the 1920s and the interest in geography brought 
by the war, an investment that also reflected the growing competition in 
the cartographic industry. Competition from Europe was a particularly 
sore subject among American mapmakers, a reminder of the long alleged 
inferiority of their own work. Max Mayer (1930, 976, 1663), an American 
cartographer, sarcastically commented in 1930 that Americans “have had 
nothing worth the name of an atlas. To claim there is such a publication is 
“The company also initiated
aggressive advertising
campaigns to capitalize on the 
prosperity of the 1920s and the 
interest in geography brought 
by the war, an investment that 
also reflected the growing
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to admit our poor aesthetic sense.” American atlases, he continued, were 
simply lost in “a wilderness of meaningless names” (Mayer 1930, 1663).23 
This ongoing debate over the appeal and merit of American cartography 
erupted into a legal and economic question in 1929, when Rand McNally 
led a campaign to include European maps on the list of imports eligible 
for duties under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. To critics like Mayer, the very 
question of protectionism indicated the superiority of European cartogra-
phy. For Rand McNally, however, the question was more a reflection of its 
struggle to maintain dominance in America after having adopted new and 
more expensive physical maps for Goode’s School Atlas. In fact, the threat 
came not from European atlases themselves but the increasingly common 
practice of American textbook and atlas publishers contracting with Euro-
pean cartographers for maps that were imported and then reproduced in 
the United States. Though European production methods were more time-
consuming, the relative scale of wages in the two countries still favored 
imports. Companies importing these maps claimed that no comparable 
product existed in the United States. Faced with increasing losses in their 
share of the educational atlas market, Rand McNally and the Map Engrav-
ers and Publishers of America fought but failed to raise the tariff on all 
European maps.24
In the hopes of capitalizing on postwar interest in world events—and to 
protect the market it had previously dominated with relative ease—Rand 
McNally also embarked on an advertising campaign that paradoxically 
celebrated both the romance and the utility of its maps. The association of 
Rand McNally with accuracy was one of the primary goals of the interwar 
advertising campaign, and thus the geographic upheavals wrought by 
the armistice were frequently at the center of these advertisements. One 
1921 ad featured a curious young boy asking his father to locate newly 
independent Czechoslovakia on the map. The ad suggested that such a 
question might easily embarrass any parent who had not kept up with the 
news, an error easily remedied through the purchase of a Rand McNally 
atlas, which could always be depended upon to print the latest boundary 
changes.25 Like the legendary mouthwash ads that preyed on personal 
anxiety in the 1920s, these ads acknowledged the confusing nature of the 
postwar world and insisted that this knowledge be readily available to 
every American family. Hammond sold its 1920 Modern Atlas through a 
similar appeal:
See If Your Atlas Shows
The Seat of the League of Nations . . . The Status of the City of Dan-
zig . . . The New Country of Poland . . . The Plebiscites of Silestia and 
Schleswig . . . The New Countries of Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia . . . 
The Empire of Mongolia . . . The Mandatory Control of Former German 
Colonies in Africa . . . The Territory Awarded to France and Belgium . . 
. The Republic of Esthonia . . . The Roosevelt River in Brazil.
IF IT DOES NOT SHOW THESE, IT SHOWS
A World That No Longer Exists
Notice here that the focus is not geographical relationships but locations, 
and that an “accurate” map was one that identified every city, town, or 
village. The talisman of comprehensiveness was exemplified by a 1920 
ad boasting that Rand McNally maps included villages found nowhere 
else, including “the little dot that stands for New Dongola.” Though few 
people would ever visit this village, situated between the Sahara and Nu-
bian deserts, they could rely on the company to map its precise location. 
Whether a reader was looking for New York or Nigeria, Rand McNally 
“The ongoing debate over the 
appeal and merit of American 
cartography erupted into a legal 
and economic question in
1929 . . .”
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Figure 7. Many of Rand McNally’s advertisements also included appeals to the adventurous and the 
exotic.
promised they would be mapped with equal accuracy, for “maps are 
worthless unless they are exact” (Figure 6).26
These ads also suggest that atlases—long considered reference tools—
were now marketed as leisure commodities, the keys to unlocking the 
adventures of “Conrad’s seas and Kipling’s India.” Rand McNally atlases 
would help both children and adults to imagine worlds they might never 
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see; exploring civilizations as old and distant as China, “without stirring 
from your easy chair.” As the advertisement concluded, “[e]very member 
of your family will profit in culture and knowledge from a Rand McNally 
Atlas.”27 In previous decades, few if any advertisements or reviews had so 
directly suggested the cultural value of cartography, rather they stressed 
its utility as a reference source for businessmen and students. Central 
to this new strategy was an appeal to the romance, adventure, and even 
voyeurism of distant lands. In 1922, the company imagined the “Forbid-
den City of Lhasa” as simultaneously compelling and repulsive to western 
eyes (Figure 7), a city where
the Christian is excluded and where decay stalks in the streets. . . . The 
past—with its mystery, its customs, its stand-still civilization, lifts its 
ugly head and leers at the modern and uplifting. Dogs and pigs roam 
at will. . . . This forbidden city has lived for centuries in a little world 
of its own. In the sunlight it is a gorgeous spectacle which fades upon 
close approach into a sordid abode of the unwashed and crafty. It is a 
part of the great romance of Geography, made clear by maps.28
Rand McNally’s general turn towards “adventure” in the 1920s also 
reflects the explosive growth of the National Geographic Society. With 
a membership that reached one million by 1926, the Society had clearly 
tapped the public’s desire to learn about the world beyond its borders. 
With its richly illustrated monthly, the Society brought the distant reaches 
of exotic lands into American living rooms and libraries, thereby creating 
a kind of culture around geographic knowledge that could not have gone 
unnoticed at Rand McNally. In fact, the latter advertised regularly in the 
pages of the Geographic until the Society judged the company a direct com-
petitor and ended the relationship in 1928. These ads suggested precisely 
the sophistication and cosmopolitanism sought by those guarding their 
membership in the Society.29
The early twentieth century brought a slow and steady stream of Ameri-
cans into contact with maps and atlases. Geography was gradually becom-
ing not just a school subject or a reference tool, but a cultural commodity 
as well. Rand McNally translated this interest into a broadened audience 
for cartography, aided particularly by the booming demand for domestic 
road maps in the 1920s. This ability to strengthen their reputation as a 
cartographic authority would prove central to their success in the 1940s. 
Like the National Geographic Society, Rand McNally strove to create a 
world that made sense to its public. Though it capitalized on the upheav-
als brought by World War One and the Treaty of Versailles, the company 
designed a world that fit American notions of how the world ought to 
appear. In fact, what is most striking about these atlases is the degree to 
which they maintained a tradition begun years earlier. Rand McNally kept 
new maps out of mass-market atlases in the 1920s because the company 
was wary of directly challenging a public whose visual sense of the world 
had been cultivated by years of exposure to political maps and the Merca-
tor projection. However appropriate Goode’s maps were for “educational” 
purposes, Rand McNally was cautious about their acceptability as prod-
ucts for mass consumption. This suggests that the history of cartography 
is governed not just by technological and scientific advances, but also by 
a complex interplay of expectations between mapmakers and consumers. 
While the atlas remained relatively stable through the interwar years, by 
the late 1930s news of conflict in Europe and East Asia once again drew 
CONCLUDING  REMARKS
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American eyes abroad, and the World War that followed, together with 
the revolution in air transportation, challenged the representations as well 
as the realities of world geography.
1. See Adams (1912, 198-201 and passim) and Raisz (1938, 50), quoted in 
Woodward (1977, 124-125).
2. Dörflinger’s (1997, 244-246) study of Austrian atlases indicates that this 
trend was mirrored in Europe. The number of non-European regional 
maps in these atlases rose from about 20% in the 1870s to 30% by World 
War I, corresponding to a decrease in the number of Austro-Hungar-
ian and European maps. In these atlases, the United States was the first 
non-European area to be mapped with more detail, followed by east Asia, 
particularly China and Japan.
3. Quote is from the Chicago Inter Ocean review of Rand McNally’s Busi-
ness Atlas, March 6, 1899, found in II Cartographic Publishing, Box 1, Rand 
McNally Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago.
4. The Cram atlases of the early twentieth century also emphasized the 
growth of American territory; their Ideal Reference Atlas (1902) opened with 
full-page maps of the new territories and of the proposed Nicaraguan and 
Panama Canals, while all of South America was divided into two maps.
5. Interestingly, none of the African maps covered either the West African 
coast or the Congo region. Rand McNally’s New Family Atlas of the World 
(1914b) also devoted a large map just to Luzon, though by 1916 the Philip-
pines were no longer mapped together with the United States, but rather 
with the other Pacific Islands in the Imperial Atlas. 
6. Quote is from Alfred Sidney Johnson (1922, 1166), an employee in the 
Map Department of Rand McNally. 
7. Another example was the changing description of the soil in Cuba. In 
1900 the atlas enthusiastically characterized the soil as having inexhaust-
ible fertility, while twelve years later it was considered only “highly favor-
able.” 
8. Rand McNally produced eight atlases geared to the war. 
9. Rand McNally, Graphic Representation of the Battle Fields of Today (1915); 
Rand McNally’s Atlas of the World War (1918); rival companies produced 
similar atlases, such as Hammond’s New Map of Europe, Showing Seat of Aus-
tro-Servian War (1914), and Cram’s Atlas of the War in Europe (1915).
10. An exception of an American atlas that used small scale maps was 
C.S. Hammond’s (1918) Brentano’s Record Atlas (New York: CS Hammond, 
1918). With maps of the western front drawn on a scale of 1-10 (1 inch 
to 10 miles), they were able to illustrate political boundaries, railways, 
altitudes, wireless stations, fortresses, fortified towns, arsenals, aircraft 
depots, forests and woods, and canals.
11. Letter of J.R. Purser, Charlotte, North Carolina, to National Geographic 
Society, dated September 14, 1918, in “Suggestions—Film 1915-1923,” 
Records Division, National Geographic Society.
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12.  Albert Holt Bumstead, memo to Gilbert Grosvenor dated December 
24, 1915; item 11-10015.837, Records Division, National Geographic Soci-
ety.
13. Letter of A.F. Henning, Dallas, Texas, to National Geographic Society, 
dated February 5, 1917, in “Suggestions—Film 1915-1923,” Records Divi-
sion, National Geographic Society. Caleb D. Hammond, interview with the 
author, March 3, 1995, Maplewood, New Jersey.
14. See also Rand McNally (1918; 1921).
15. On radio broadcasts, see Dunning (1976, 28-29) and Buxton (1972, 12). 
On the relationship between commercial mapping and automobile culture, 
see Akerman (1993a; 1993b). Quote is from Ruth Leigh, “Selling Globes 
and Atlases,” reprinted from Publishers’ Weekly (Chicago: Rand McNally & 
Co., 1929), in “History” Box, Rand McNally Collection, Newberry Library, 
Chicago. 
16. Quote is from Bruce Grant (1956, 21), quoting W.G. North in interview 
with Andrew McNally III. Gilbert H. Grosvenor, letter to Albert Holt 
Bumstead dated November 14, 1918, in National Geographic Society, Re-
cords Division, GHG 11-10015.837. Though Bumstead devised numerous 
projections of his own, the Society relied on the Van der Grinten projection 
for all its world maps from 1922 - 1988, a projection that—as Jeremy Black 
(1997, 31) has noted—continued to exaggerate the temperate latitudes, 
a flaw appropriate to Cold War mapmakers’ tendency to emphasize the 
Soviet Union’s power and size.
17. See Henrikson (1980, 95 fn 9). Even earlier, in 1811, a nationalistic 
Congress had contested the prime meridian of Greenwich, and replaced 
it with their own national meridian which ran first through Philadelphia, 
and then the District of Columbia. Only with the international recogni-
tion of Greenwich as the sole prime meridian in 1884 did the United States 
relinquish its own. See Edney (1994).
18. Exceptions occurred in National Geographic maps of 1935 and 1941, 
where the world was mapped as two separate circular hemispheres, neces-
sarily placing the Western Hemisphere on the left side of the map. Gener-
ally the widest circulating atlases of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century—Century, Rand McNally, Hammond, Colton, and Mitchell, to 
name a few—also placed the United States at the center of their Mercator-
based world maps. 
19. This is not to say that Goode’s atlases were not successful: among high 
schools it has been the atlas of choice, and was extensively used in Army 
War Colleges during the Second World War.
20. Grant (1956, 21), quoting W.G. North in interview with Andrew Mc-
Nally III.
21. See Rand McNally World Atlas: Premier Edition (1932, 1937). Rand Mc-
Nally’s other contemporary series—World Atlas: Commonwealth Edition—
also did not include physical maps of any kind. C.S. Hammond delayed 
introducing physical maps into its best-selling atlases; as late as 1937, its 
Modern Illustrated Atlas of the World, and Unabridged Atlas and Gazetteer of 
the World still included no physical maps.
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22. Other institutional clients included The Pure Oil Company, Rock Is-
land Lines, American Surety Company, Chicago North and Western Lines, 
the Bureau of Air Commerce, Pan American Airways, and the Monsanto 
Chemical Company. See Rand McNally Photograph Collections, illus-
trating different custom made maps, globes, and displays for corporate 
clients, found in Box 7, Photographs and Scrapbooks, Rand McNally Col-
lection, Newberry Library, Chicago.
23. Even J. Paul Goode recognized the excellence of the German and Brit-
ish atlases yet took care to argue for the democratizing influence of wax 
engraving on the American map industry.
24. “Brief On Behalf of Map Engravers and Publishers in Support of an In-
crease of Duties on Maps,” Finance Committee, United States Senate, 71st 
Congress, “History” Box, Rand McNally Collection, Newberry Library, 
Chicago. Also see Clow (1929).
25. Advertisement in Review of Reviews, November 1921. All Rand McNally 
advertisements collected in unmarked folder, Rand McNally Collection, 
Newberry Library, Chicago.
26. Advertisement in C.S. Hammond Company Records. Advertisement 
in The American, September 1920. Other ads that referred to the accuracy of 
Rand McNally world atlases can be found in World’s Work, November 1920; 
Century, March 1924; Asia, April 1924; Atlantic Monthly, August 1924; Sunset, 
March 1926; Sunset, November 1926; and Review of Reviews, May 1928.
27. Red Book, 1926. For other ads invoking the romance of the atlases, see 
Sunset, June 1926; Sunset, May 1927; Review of Reviews, September 1928; 
World’s Work, December 1928. Advertisement with an interest in China ap-
peared in World’s Work, October 1922.
28. Advertisement found in Geographic, February 1922.
29. Andrew McNally III, interview with the author, June 14, 1994, Chicago, 
Illinois. This growth of geography as a leisure activity was also evident in 
the sales strategies for globes, which were no longer simply schoolroom 
fixtures but now sold in furniture stores as decorative pieces. See Ruth 
Leigh, “Selling Globes and Atlases,” reprinted from Publishers’ Weekly 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1929).
I would like to acknowledge the use of the two projections created by 
Martin von Wyss, the help offered by Mark Monmonier, and the com-
ments from the external reviewers.
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